Taiwan’s Concerns and Symposium on the Third Plenary Session

Taiwan should be one of the countries in the world most concerned about the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The outcome of this meeting may determine China’s future economic development and the trajectory of cross-strait relations with Taiwan. On July 18, Taiwan’s National Policy Research Institute Cultural and Educational Foundation held a symposium titled “The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and New Rules for Punishing Taiwan Independence.” At the symposium, Taiwanese scholars researching mainland China presented key observations on China’s Third Plenary Session.

Different Focuses and Axes in Xi Jinping’s Three Terms

In the first term, Xi Jinping’s statement focused on the “Decision on Several Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform.” He promoted the modernization of the national governance system and governance capabilities, emphasizing the decisive role of the market in resource allocation and the government’s role. This led to the phenomenon of “the people retreat and the country advances.”

During Xi’s second term, the meeting was held half a year ahead of schedule, breaking from the traditional economic policy model and instead focusing on the reform of state institutions. The main focus was on “Deepening the Reform of Party and State Institutions.” However, its conclusion was to amend the constitution, cancel the presidential term limit, and create Xi Jinping’s lifelong tenure. Since then, Xi Jinping has personally commanded and deployed economic policies, completely replacing Li Keqiang’s economic dominance.

In Xi’s third term, the meeting was delayed by nearly half a year and focused on the “Decision to Further Deepen Reforms and Promote Chinese-style Modernization.” It summed up the experience of deepening reforms over the past ten years and focused on future reform practices. The theme of further deepening reform continues from the 18th session. Although the meeting communiqué is comprehensive, it indicates a focus on strengthening the deepening reform of the party’s management rather than making a significant breakthrough.

Routes and Systems of Economic Development and Personnel Changes

The route of economic development has shifted from focusing on “economic construction as the center,” as seen in the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in 1978, to “economic repair as the center.” Xi proposes repair measures to solve problems rather than making drastic changes, such as introducing three new economic drivers to replace the traditional “Troika.”

The systems of economic development have transitioned from “stability above all else” to “security above all else,” establishing an economic system with national security as the core. Recent security laws indicate that national security is a fundamental foundation for the steady and long-term progress of Chinese-style modernization. It is necessary to fully implement the overall national security concept, improve the system and mechanisms for maintaining national security, and achieve high-quality development and high-level security.

Personnel changes were made in accordance with the provisions of the Party Constitution. The plenary session decided to replace alternate members of the Central Committee, such as Ding Xiangqun, Yu Lijun, and Yu Jihong, with new members. After top-level changes in the Rocket Force in 2023, Wang Houbin and Xu Xisheng were not added to the Central Committee. Additionally, after Dong Jun was appointed Minister of National Defense, he was not added to the Central Military Commission. The plenary session accepted Comrade Qin Gang’s resignation and removed him from his position as a member of the Central Committee. The Central Military Commission of the CPC also confirmed the expulsion of Li Shangfu, Li Yuchao, and Sun Jinming from the party due to serious violations of discipline and law.

Three Challenges of the Future Paths

Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has emphasized the “Chinese model,” “Chinese road,” and “Chinese-style modernization,” promoting confidence in the nation’s path, theory, system, and culture, and rejecting foreign models. Xi insists on not following the successful Western democratic system, adhering instead to authoritarian rule. From the “Socialist Market Economy” of the Third Plenary Session of the 14th CPC Central Committee to Xi Jinping’s “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” of the 18th CPC Central Committee and the “Chinese Style” of the 20th CPC Central Committee, Xi Jinping has evolved socialism to his autocratic governance model.

At the symposium, Dr. Hong Yaonan, Deputy Director of the Center for Mainland China Studies at Tamkang University, highlighted three key problems that need to be solved. Xi Jinping’s “problem-oriented planning” focuses on practical issues in China’s economic development: the productivity contradiction caused by aging, the mismatch of central and local financial power under land finance, and regional protectionism versus the national cycle. The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee proposed improvement plans, such as the central-local fiscal and tax allocation system, to address the sequelae of the 1994 central-local financial planning law.

Conclusion: Nothing at All

Mao Zedong replaced revolution with continuing revolution, Deng Xiaoping replaced continuing revolution with reform, and Xi Jinping replaced reform with deepening reform. The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee declared the end of the economic reform era initiated by the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee during Deng Xiaoping’s era. The root cause of China’s economic problems lies in politics. Without systemic changes, no matter how many meetings are held, they will still destroy progress.

China’s economy has been gradually declining since 2018, with no signs of stopping. Society is looking forward to a meeting similar to the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee to break the deadlock with major reforms and restore social confidence. However, since Li Qiang came to power, most economic rescue measures have been patchy, and the anticipated Third Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee has yet to bring about breakthrough reform plans. This weakens Xi Jinping’s reform image and lowers external expectations. Despite propaganda efforts to elevate the Third Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee to the level of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee and portray Xi Jinping as a reformer like Deng Xiaoping, it only highlights his powerlessness as a reformer. The outside world and the Chinese people have no expectations for the Third Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee.