On June 21, 2024, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) issued the “Several Opinions on Disciplining Taiwan Independence Separatists,” clearly identifying Taiwan independence activists and specifying the types of activities subject to disciplinary measures. This document not only demonstrates the CCP’s firm stance on Taiwan independence movements but also reveals its strategic layout concerning the Taiwan Strait issue. This article provides an in-depth analysis of the content, background, and impact of these opinions on cross-strait relations.

Key Content and Punitive Measures

The 22 Opinions delineate five categories of Taiwan independence activists and activities deserving disciplinary action. These include political figures, scholars, and opinion leaders openly advocating for Taiwan independence; core members participating in and leading Taiwan independence-related organizations; influencers disseminating Taiwan independence ideologies through media, publications, or social platforms; financiers and supporters providing resources for Taiwan independence activities; and participants involved in behaviors posing serious threats to national unity.

The CCP has specified punitive measures against these activists advocating Taiwan independence, including:

– Prohibiting their entry into mainland China and Hong Kong to prevent their activities within China.

– Freezing their assets on the mainland to limit their economic capacity.

– Restricting their engagement in commercial activities to further weaken their economic influence.

– Pursuing criminal charges against those involved in severe cases.

Most surprisingly, China’s regulations on disciplining Taiwan independence activists include the possibility of “trial in absentia.” This legal framework stipulates that for principal offenders involved in acts of splitting the country or those convicted of serious offenses, they could face life imprisonment or a minimum of ten years in prison. In cases deemed particularly severe or malicious, the death penalty may be imposed.

These measures demonstrate the CCP’s effort to exert pressure on Taiwan independence activists through multiple means to curb the spread of Taiwan independence activities.

Comparing with Hong Kong’s Basic Law Article 23 and National Security Law

Hong Kong’s Basic Law Article 23 stipulates that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) shall enact laws to prohibit acts of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the central government, and theft of state secrets. However, due to strong opposition within Hong Kong society, legislation under Article 23 has not been successfully enacted.

In contrast, the National Security Law for Hong Kong, passed directly by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) in 2020, covers offenses such as secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign or external forces that endanger national security. It grants extensive enforcement powers to Hong Kong’s national security agencies.

Compared to the Hong Kong National Security Law, China’s 22 Opinions targeting Taiwan independence activists lack legal enforceability but clearly demonstrate political intent and a deterrent effect. The Opinions primarily utilize administrative and economic measures to discipline activists advocating Taiwan independence, rather than relying on legal procedures, making them more flexible but also more authoritarian in execution.

The Dual Strategy of the CCP

The CCP adopts a dual strategy in addressing the Taiwan issue. On one hand, it employs various means to promote cross-strait integration. It emphasizes economic cooperation aimed at deepening economic interdependence between Taiwan and mainland China, thereby increasing Taiwan’s economic reliance on the mainland. 

Simultaneously, cultural exchange initiatives are promoted to foster mutual understanding and emotional bonds between people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, thereby promoting cultural identity. Furthermore, the CCP encourages interactions and exchanges among civil organizations and individuals across the strait to improve bilateral relations through non-governmental channels.

Regarding the discipline of activists advocating Taiwan independence, the CCP intends to deter individuals and their supporters through measures outlined in the 22 Opinions. Specific actions include freezing assets and imposing entry bans, directly impacting the economic foundations and mobility of activists supporting Taiwan independence. Additionally, the issuance of these disciplinary opinions aims to psychologically intimidate these activists and their supporters, creating fear and unease. 

Director Chang Wu-Ueh from the Center of Cross-Strait Studies at Tamkang University, Taiwan, indicates that this approach serves three purposes for mainland China: domestically, it provides a rationale; internationally, it makes a statement; and in relation to Taiwan, it serves as a deterrent, underscoring differential treatment between Taiwanese nationals and others.

This dual strategy underscores China’s multifaceted approach to the Taiwan issue, combining efforts to enhance integration while simultaneously employing punitive measures to suppress Taiwan independence movements.

Assessment of CCP’s Deterrence Strategies

The theory of deterrence is a strategic concept in international relations, explaining how the threat or use of force or punishment can deter adversaries from taking unfavorable actions. According to this theory, China’s 22 Opinions demonstrate their deterrent effect in several aspects:

– The issuance of the Opinions by authoritative bodies like the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Justice carries an intimidating effect.

– The Opinions cover a wide range of groups related to Taiwan independence, thereby increasing the breadth of their deterrent effect.

– Measures outlined include restrictions on economic activities, travel bans, and asset freezes, which carry significant punitive consequences.

However, maintaining a long-term deterrent effect requires continuous resource allocation and policy support.

Nevertheless, these Opinions face significant challenges in actual implementation, especially concerning international law enforcement and extradition issues. For activists supporting Taiwan independence residing abroad, China’s punitive measures are almost impractical. Interpol, for instance, operates under its own regulations and procedures, making it difficult for China to extradite these individuals without extradition agreements. Additionally, international law imposes strict rules regarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity, necessitating the consent and cooperation of relevant countries for cross-border arrests and extraditions. 

These factors make it extremely challenging for China to enforce punitive measures against activists advocating Taiwan independence on an international scale. The international community may criticize China for its unilateral punitive measures, viewing them as lacking legitimacy, transparency, and potentially violating international human rights law. Therefore, China’s deterrence primarily operates at psychological and economic levels rather than through actual criminal prosecutions.

Impact on Taiwanese Society, Public Opinion, Culture, and Education

China’s 22 measures have profoundly influenced Taiwanese society in several ways. Many Taiwanese citizens may feel fear and insecurity due to China’s threats, especially those who individually or within their families support Taiwan independence. They may worry about the potential impacts on their safety and economic interests. However, China’s hardline stance may also provoke resentment and opposition among Taiwanese citizens, further exacerbating cross-strait tensions. 

In terms of public opinion and media response, China’s 22 measures could deepen divisions within Taiwanese public opinion. Some may view these measures as encroaching upon Taiwan’s sovereignty and vehemently oppose them, while others may advocate for peaceful relations with the mainland to avoid conflict. Media coverage and commentary in Taiwan regarding China’s measures could sway public opinion, stimulating further discussion and debate on the issue of Taiwan independence. 

Regarding culture and education, Taiwan’s educational institutions may intensify teachings on democracy, freedom, and human rights, emphasizing the importance of resisting external pressures and safeguarding national dignity. China’s threats could potentially enhance Taiwanese cultural confidence and identity, reinforcing attachment to local culture and values.

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) has strongly opposed and condemned China’s 22 measures. The MAC perceives these measures as political threats and intimidation aimed at suppressing Taiwan’s democracy and freedom, undermining peaceful cross-strait development. The MAC asserts that Taiwan will continue to defend its democracy, freedom, and sovereignty without succumbing to China’s threats. Furthermore, the MAC calls upon the international community to condemn China’s political oppression against Taiwan and support Taiwan’s democratic development.

Conclusion

China’s 22 Measures for disciplining Taiwan independence activists reveal its strategic approach towards Taiwan and its implications for cross-strait relations. These measures categorize and prescribe punitive actions, including administrative restrictions like travel bans and asset freezes, and economic sanctions aimed at weakening Taiwan independence advocates. Comparing with Hong Kong’s legislative efforts underscores China’s consistent strategy to maintain political stability and national unity.

However, the effectiveness of these measures faces challenges both domestically and internationally. Domestically, they may deepen divisions within Taiwan, eliciting fear and defiance among supporters of independence. Internationally, concerns about their unilateral nature and compatibility with international norms could strain China’s relations with democratic nations advocating for Taiwan’s autonomy.

Moreover, China’s dual strategy of promoting cross-strait integration while employing punitive measures reflects its nuanced approach. Looking ahead, the implications for cross-strait relations remain complex and uncertain, risking tensions and hindering prospects for peaceful dialogue.

In summary, China’s 22 Measures represent a significant component of its strategy towards Taiwan, showcasing both assertiveness and challenges in managing cross-strait relations. Constructive engagement and dialogue supported by the international community will be crucial in addressing these challenges and promoting regional stability.