言語別アーカイブ
基本操作
The Reality and Challenges of China’s Taiwan-Friendly Policies
第16回海峡フォーラム大会(写真新華社)
第16回海峡フォーラム大会(写真新華社)

At the 2024 Straits Forum, China did not announce any new Taiwan-friendly measures, leading to widespread disappointment. Kuomintang (KMT) Vice Chairman Lian Shengwen noted that the current cross-strait atmosphere is unfavorable, naturally resulting in a lack of such measures. However, this year’s Taiwan election showed that at least 60% of the populace does not support the current Taiwanese leaders’ pro-independence stance and actions. Most Taiwanese people hope for peaceful coexistence with their Chinese counterparts. Despite political differences, the desire for peaceful relations remains prevalent. Lian Shengwen again remarked, “I think this is a mainstream sentiment that no one can ignore.”

Over the past eight years, cross-strait relations have been tumultuous, with China’s Taiwan-friendly measures often closely tied to political timing, especially in sectors like petrochemicals, machinery, and agriculture, which are heavily dependent on the Chinese market. On the eve of elections, China tends to introduce or halt certain Taiwan-friendly policies in an attempt to influence Taiwan’s elections or economy.

In reality, the impact of these measures has been limited. For instance, the 26 Taiwan-friendly measures introduced by China in 2019 aimed to promote cross-strait economic and cultural exchanges, but their actual impact was minimal. Prior to the 2024 presidential election, China announced the suspension of 134 Taiwan-friendly items under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).

The Historical Significance and Current Status of ECFA

Looking back 20 years, the signing of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) was a significant economic measure at the time. The concessions under ECFA were seen as Taiwan-friendly policies, primarily benefiting certain Taiwanese industries through tariff reductions. However, over time, Taiwan’s industrial dependence on the Chinese market has significantly decreased, and many industries no longer rely on these policies. Today, tourism might be the only sector still hoping for Taiwan-friendly measures from China. The evolution of Taiwan’s economy reflects a strategic shift towards reducing over-reliance on a single market and enhancing resilience against external economic pressures.

According to data from the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research, Taiwan’s annual export growth rate to China reached 15% in the first three years after ECFA was signed in 2010, but in the past five years, the annual growth rate has dropped below 5%. This decline underscores the changing dynamics of cross-strait trade and the need for Taiwan to diversify its economic partnerships. Moving forward, Taiwan’s focus on innovation, high-tech industries, and global market expansion will be crucial in maintaining its economic growth. By investing in research and development, fostering entrepreneurship, and strengthening trade ties with other countries, Taiwan can secure a more stable and prosperous economic future.

The Reality and Challenges of the Tourism Industry

China’s outbound tourism policy is often closely aligned with its diplomatic strategy, granting more travel quotas to friendly countries while restricting them for unfriendly ones. This strategy is also reflected in Taiwan’s tourism industry. Taiwanese tourism operators and the Mainland Affairs Council hope that China will lift restrictions on tour groups, but such expectations are unrealistic. In the past, Chinese tour groups were controlled by Chinese companies operating in a monopolistic “one-stop” travel model, which did not bring long-term benefits to Taiwan. For example, in 2019, China’s restrictions on individual travel to Taiwan resulted in a loss of about NT$30 billion for Taiwan’s tourism industry. This demonstrates the significant economic impact that China’s tourism policies can have on Taiwan, highlighting the need for Taiwan to diversify its tourism market and reduce its reliance on Chinese tourists.

In order to mitigate the negative effects of such policies, Taiwan’s tourism industry must explore new markets and develop more sustainable and resilient business models. Efforts should be made to attract tourists from other regions, such as Southeast Asia, Europe, and North America. Additionally, the industry could benefit from investing in digital marketing, improving service quality, and promoting Taiwan’s unique cultural and natural attractions. By doing so, Taiwan can build a more robust and diverse tourism sector that is less vulnerable to external political influences and better positioned for long-term growth and stability.

The Impact of Xiamen’s Taiwan-Friendly Policies

During the forum, Xiamen’s Deputy Mayor Zhang Qirui mentioned that Taiwanese people could access the “Convenient Services” section for Taiwanese compatriots, which offers on-site mobile payment services at the hotels where guests are staying. He also announced that Taiwan Compatriot Permits, Residence Permits, and Temporary Entry Motor Vehicle Driving Permits will be processed together through this service section. Additionally, the processing time for the Taiwan Compatriot Permit has been reduced to three working days.

However, these policies hold little significance for residents of Taiwan proper. These policies may be effective for Kinmen residents or Taiwanese businessmen in Fujian but have almost no appeal to those living in Taiwan proper. According to data from the Xiamen government, about 2,000 Taiwanese businessmen and students applied for residence permits in Xiamen in 2019, accounting for only 0.01% of Taiwan’s total population.

China’s Political Stance and Taiwan’s Response

Apart from tourism, remarks by Wang Huning, Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, at the Straits Forum raised concerns in Taiwan. He emphasized that “Taiwan has historically been part of China,” a statement that disappointed many Taiwanese, leaving cross-strait relations rooted only in blood ties or nationalism. However, such historical perspectives are not widely accepted in Taiwanese society.

Wang Huning’s statement reflects the Chinese Communist Party’s stance on cross-strait relations under the “One China” principle, wherein Taiwan is considered part of China. This historical view is not widely accepted in Taiwan, especially since the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949 and cannot represent or inherit all of China’s history and dynasties. According to a 2023 survey by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation, over 70% of Taiwanese oppose the “One Country, Two Systems” model. 

Additionally, in response to President Lai’s May 20 inauguration speech in 2025, stating that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other,” 74% of those over 20 years old agreed, and only 16% disagreed. The research concluded that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other” is a widely held consensus in Taiwanese society. Around the same time, the Mainland Affairs Council also released a poll showing that over 75% of respondents did not agree that “Taiwan is part of China,” and 88% supported that Taiwan’s future should be decided by all its people.

Taiwan’s Industrial Transformation and Risk Diversification

President Lai Ching-te’s proposal that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are not subordinate to each other aligns more with the modern cross-strait situation and the reality of their separate governance. Taiwan’s industrial development no longer entirely depends on the Chinese market, with trade dependence on China falling below 30%. Many Taiwanese companies have started to diversify risks, and even if China terminates all concessions under ECFA, Taiwan’s economy has the capacity to pivot to global markets. According to data from Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan’s exports to China accounted for only 28.9% of its total exports in 2022, while exports to Southeast Asia and North America grew by 12% and 15%, respectively.

The Challenges of China’s Taiwan-Friendly Policies and Cross-Strait Integration

China continuously proposes Taiwan-friendly policies to promote cross-strait integration, but the effectiveness and sustainability of these policies are questionable. According to market research firm IC Insights, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry held a 65% global market share in 2023, with exports to China accounting for 40% of Taiwan’s total semiconductor exports.

In the future, Taiwan might also propose “China-friendly” policies, especially in high-tech industries like semiconductors. For instance, Taiwan could offer special incentives allowing China’s semiconductor industry to purchase mid-to-high-end chips from Taiwan, on the condition that China and Taiwan are not subordinate to each other.

Economic Reciprocity and Political Realities

According to a report by the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, higher-level cross-strait economic cooperation could help boost the GDP growth rate of both sides by about 1% annually. Economic cooperation should be a common goal for people on both sides of the strait, as it has the potential to foster mutual prosperity and stability. However, the reality of “Taiwan-friendly” policies often implies a hierarchical relationship, which creates an imbalance and cannot truly bridge the gap between the two sides. This imbalance often leads to mistrust and skepticism, making it difficult to achieve genuine economic integration and mutual benefits.

To enhance reciprocal mechanisms, cooperation should not only cover economic and technological industries but also include mutual respect for each other’s values. It is crucial to promote tolerance and understanding of cultural differences under different political systems. This can be achieved through increased cultural exchanges, educational programs, and joint initiatives that address global challenges such as environmental protection and public health. By fostering an environment of mutual respect and understanding, both sides can work towards building a more inclusive and collaborative relationship, paving the way for long-term peace and prosperity in the region.

Conclusion

The development of cross-strait relations faces multiple challenges and opportunities, with reciprocal cooperation being the key to achieving long-term stability and prosperity. Although historical and ideological differences exist between the two sides, only through mutual respect, equal dialogue, and mutually beneficial cooperation can healthy development in cross-strait relations be truly realized.

Both sides should establish more open and inclusive trust mechanisms, clarify historical misunderstandings, and jointly explore ways to prosper together in the modern international system. For example, expanding cultural exchanges, enhancing environmental protection, and jointly addressing global challenges can foster mutual understanding and trust between the people on both sides of the strait.

Taiwan, as an important economic hub in the Asia-Pacific region, boasts abundant talent and innovation. In the future, Taiwan can further open its market, promote economic cooperation with other Asian countries and North America, and leverage its potential in cooperation with China, particularly in emerging fields such as high-tech, green energy, and biotechnology.

Taiwan and China, both sides should work together to advance cross-strait relations on the basis of peaceful development. This will not only benefit the people on both sides of the strait but also contribute to regional and global stability and prosperity. Achieving this vision requires the joint efforts of both governments and all sectors of society to realize long-term stability, peace, and shared prosperity.

陳建甫博士、淡江大学中国大陸研究所所長(2020年~)(副教授)、新南向及び一帯一路研究センター所長(2018年~)。 研究テーマは、中国の一帯一路インフラ建設、中国のシャープパワー、中国社会問題、ASEAN諸国・南アジア研究、新南向政策、アジア選挙・議会研究など。オハイオ州立大学で博士号を取得し、2006年から2008年まで淡江大学未来学研究所所長を務めた。 台湾アジア自由選挙観測協会(TANFREL)の創設者及び名誉会長であり、2010年フィリピン(ANFREL)、2011年タイ(ANFREL)、2012年モンゴル(Women for Social Progress WSP)、2013年マレーシア(Bersih)、2013年カンボジア(COMFREL)、2013年ネパール(ANFREL)、2015年スリランカ、2016年香港、2017年東ティモール、2018年マレーシア(TANFREL)、2019年インドネシア(TANFREL)、2019年フィリピン(TANFREL)など数多くのアジア諸国の選挙観測任務に参加した。 台湾の市民社会問題に積極的に関与し、公民監督国会連盟の常務理事(2007年~2012年)、議会のインターネットビデオ中継チャネルを提唱するグループ(VOD)の招集者(2012年~)、台湾平和草の根連合の理事長(2008年~2013年)、台湾世代教育基金会の理事(2014年~2019年)などを歴任した。現在は、台湾民主化基金会理事(2018年~)、台湾2050教育基金会理事(2020年~)、台湾中国一帯一路研究会理事長(2020年~)、『淡江国際・地域研究季刊』共同発行人などを務めている。 // Chien-Fu Chen(陳建甫) is an associate professor, currently serves as the Chair, Graduate Institute of China Studies, Tamkang University, TAIWAN (2020-). Dr. Chen has worked the Director, the Center of New Southbound Policy and Belt Road Initiative (NSPBRI) since 2018. Dr. Chen focuses on China’s RRI infrastructure construction, sharp power, and social problems, Indo-Pacific strategies, and Asian election and parliamentary studies. Prior to that, Dr. Chen served as the Chair, Graduate Institute of Future Studies, Tamkang University (2006-2008) and earned the Ph.D. from the Ohio State University, USA. Parallel to his academic works, Dr. Chen has been actively involved in many civil society organizations and activities. He has been as the co-founder, president, Honorary president, Taiwan Asian Network for Free Elections(TANFREL) and attended many elections observation mission in Asia countries, including Philippine (2010), Thailand (2011), Mongolian (2012), Malaysia (2013 and 2018), Cambodian (2013), Nepal (2013), Sri Lanka (2015), Hong Kong (2016), Timor-Leste (2017), Indonesia (2019) and Philippine (2019). Prior to election mission, Dr. Chen served as the Standing Director of the Citizen Congress Watch (2007-2012) and the President of Taiwan Grassroots Alliance for Peace (2008-2013) and Taiwan Next Generation Educational Foundation (2014-2019). Dr. Chen works for the co-founders, president of China Belt Road Studies Association(CBRSA) and co-publisher Tamkang Journal of International and Regional Studies Quarterly (Chinese Journal). He also serves as the trustee board of Taiwan Foundation for Democracy(TFD) and Taiwan 2050 Educational Foundation.