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Not So Quiet on the Taiwan Front?!
2021年4月30日
FILE PHOTO: An oyster farmer walks in front of China's Xiamen, ahead of the 60th anniversary of Second Taiwan Straits Crisis against China, on Lieyu Island, Kinmen County, Taiwan August 20, 2018. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu/File Photo To match Special Report HONGKONG-TAIWAN/MILITARY
FILE PHOTO: An oyster farmer walks in front of China's Xiamen, ahead of the 60th anniversary of Second Taiwan Straits Crisis against China, on Lieyu Island, Kinmen County, Taiwan August 20, 2018. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu/File Photo To match Special Report HONGKONG-TAIWAN/MILITARY

1. Warning from a senior U.S. official

“Taiwan is clearly one of their [China’s] ambitions before then. And I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact in the next six years.”

Philip Davidson, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, predicted on March 9 that China could invade Taiwan in the next six years. He added the above, after stating, “I worry that they’re accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States and our leadership role in the rules-based international order…by 2050.” [1]

Senior U.S. officials have commented, publicly and privately, on the security situation in Taiwan under the threat of China to date. However, it is very rare that they publicly present a prediction on the timing of invading Taiwan so clearly as this.

This is not the whole story. On March 23, Admiral John Aquilino, who was nominated as the next Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, also pointed out at the public hearing of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee concerning the security situation in the Indo-Pacific region that “The greatest concern is the military development of China toward Taiwan.” Furthermore, when requested to confirm the aforementioned Davidson’s remark, “China could invade Taiwan in the next six years,” he gave a sterner warning, by pointing out that the threat (the occurrence of an incident) “will materialize earlier than that.” [2]

The U.S. government has avoided clear comments on the defense of Taiwan or the security situation in Taiwan in order to not unnecessarily provoke China. On the contrary, the remarks by these two senior officials are clear and, moreover, coming from the top officers in the Indo-Pacific Command, which covers the Taiwan Strait geographically under its main defense zone of the Indo-Pacific, their remarks appear to carry weight. It should be noted that the following is written to describe how the Taiwan side is feeling and seeing the situation, not necessarily to assert that China will definitely take on Taiwan in the next six years.

2. Actions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) speak eloquently

As for the background of the aforementioned warnings by senior U.S. officials, there has been a series of provocative and disturbing moves by the PLA, such as China’s military aircrafts approaching and intruding into the Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in the Taiwan Strait since the beginning of this year. Let’s take a look at the situation only for the last two months.

 

Table: Appearances of Chinese military aircrafts around Taiwan

Date

Number of aircrafts

Breakdown

March 26

20

Y-8: 2 (Two Y-8 ASW)

KJ-500: 1 (One KJ-500 AEW&C)

H-6K: 4 (Four H-6 K)

J-16: 10 (Ten J-16)

J-10: 2 (Two J-10)

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 RECCE)

March 27

1

J-10: 1 (One J-10)

March 29

20

KJ-500: 1 (One KJ-500 AEW&C)

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 ASW)

J-16: 4 (Four J-16)

J-10: 4 (Four J-10)

March 30

1

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 ASW)

April 3

1

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 ASW)

April 4

1

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 RECCE)

April 5

8

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 ASW)

KJ-500: 1 (One KJ-500 AEW&C)

J-16: 4 (Four J-16)

J-10: 4 (Four J-10)

April 6

4

J-16: 2 (Two J-16)

KJ-500: 1 (One KJ-500 AEW&C)

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 RECCE)

April 7

15

J-10: 8 (Eight J-10)

J-16: 4 (Four J-16)

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 ASW)

KJ-500: 2 (Two KJ-500 AEW&C)

April 8

1

Y-8: 2 (Two Y-8 ASW)

April 9

11

J-10: 4 (Four J-10)

J-16: 4 (Four J-16)

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 EW)

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 ASW)

KJ-500: 1 (One KJ-500 AEW&C)

April 10

4

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 EW)

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 RECCE)

KJ-500: 2 (Two KJ-500 AEW&C)

April 11

1

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 EW)

April 12

25

Y-8: 2 (Two Y-8 ASW)

KJ-500: 1 (One KJ-500 AEW&C)

J-10: 4 (Four J-10)

J-16: 14 (Fourteen J-16)

H-6K: 4 (Four H-6 K)

※  Largest intrusion to date[3]

April 13

5

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 ASW)

J-16: 4 (Four J-16)

April 15

2

J-16: 2 (Two J-16)

April 16

1

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 RECCE)

April 17

1

J-16: 1 (One J-16)

April 18

3

Y-8: 2 (Two Y-8 ASW)

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 RECCE)

April 19

1

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 RECCE)

April 20

9

J-16: 5 (Five J-16)

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 EW)

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 RECCE)

Y-8: 2 (Two Y-8 ASW)

April 21

2

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 RECCE)

Y-8: 1 (One Y-8 EW)

Source: Prepared by the author based on materials published by the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan. [4]

 

As shown in the table, they fly by almost every day. In fact, since it happens almost every day, “Not flying by” is an “anomaly.” The Chinese military’s hegemonic provocations have become normalcy, regardless of whether regular or irregular.

For example, on April 2 a limited express train derailed in eastern Taiwan, killing 49 and injuring 247. Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed his condolences (not as President, but as “General Secretary of the Party”), saying, “I have a high degree of concern.” [5]It is a political message as if he really loved “Taiwanese compatriots.” The next day, however, Chinese military aircrafts began to intrude in Taiwan’s ADIZ again. China’s action can be only described as relentless.

3. Taiwan’s armed forces are falling into a war of attrition

In response to China’s moves, Taiwan’s armed forces have taken defensive measures, such as scrambling fighter aircraft and targeting with air defense missiles. While sufficient measures have been taken to ensure the security of Taiwan for the time being, they have to be taken so often that exhaustion of Taiwan’s armed forces is becoming increasingly serious day by day.

To begin with, Taiwan is inferior to China in terms of population, the size of its national economy, and military power. It is true that it cannot compete with China militarily. The Chinese government has continued to increase its defense budget despite the COVID-19 pandemic not being over yet.

According to an announcement by the State Council of China, the defense budget for this year (2021) is RMB1,355.3 billion (approx. ¥22.6 trillion), up 6.8% from the previous year, with the growth rate expanded for the first time in three years since 2018. [6]On the other hand, Taiwan’s defense budget for FY2021 increased by about 4.4% from the previous year to NT$366.8 billion (approx. ¥1.33 trillion), only about 1/17 of China’s. [7]Within that limited budget, moreover, Taiwan is forced to increase the cost of scrambles against Chinese aircraft. Although the figures are rather old, more than 50 aircraft intruded into Taiwan’s airspace in only September last year, costing NT$ one million per hour to operate the scrambling of one (launched) aircraft (fighter aircraft). [8]The financial burden is clear.

What is more important than expenses is human attrition. In recent years, Taiwan’s air force has had a number of accidents, resulting in casualties. To be sure, there have been no cases of pilots being killed or injured as a result of a scramble mission against incoming enemy aircraft. However, frequent responses to enemy aircraft could lead to a series of problems with military equipment. Then, accidents are bound to happen in regular drills, resulting in casualties. Training military aircraft pilots is difficult, time-consuming, and undergoes selection many times, with only those remaining becoming pilots. In that sense, they are valuable human assets that cannot be purchased only with money. It should be recognized that aircraft scrambles are directly causing the depletion of Taiwan’s military equipment and indirectly facilitating the depletion of its human resources.

In recent years, moreover, the Chinese government has been modernizing its military power through its “civil-military integration” policy. It has been focusing on the development of advanced weapons, with the results of this development increasing the threat to Taiwan. Going forward, it appears that Taiwan’s armed forces will be forced to take even more urgent responses and suffer attrition.

4. A war of attrition has the effect of psychological warfare as well

In fact, a war of attrition itself seems to have the effects of not only physical and financial attrition but also psychological attrition. In other words, the Chinese government aims to psychologically disarm Taiwan as a whole by having military aircraft approach Taiwan on a daily basis but not attack, to exhaust Taiwan’s armed forces while easing the vigilance of Taiwanese society over time. As a matter of fact, a joint survey conducted by the Taiwan International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Taiwan International Studies Association (published in March 2021) found that 63% of Taiwanese citizens think “China will not attack Taiwan.” [9]

Moreover, another poll found that there was a gap between the Taiwanese citizens’ little “concern” about the invasion of Taiwan and their “determination” for resistance to it. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (October 2020), 79.8% of Taiwanese said they would “Fight for Taiwan” against the use of force by China, exceeding 68.2% in the previous year (2019). [10]In fact, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has declared that it will “fight to the last soldier,” while its Foreign Minister Joseph Wu has expressed their determination that “If China attacks us, we will fight to the last day.” [11]

Good preparation means no worries. The aforementioned gap can be interpreted that they have “no worries” because they are “well prepared.” However, it is still necessary to be vigilant as to whether physical and psychological “preparations” will be gradually eroded under China’s aggressive war of attrition. We have to be careful about anything unusual.

5. Japan is also in a war of attrition and psychological warfare

Taiwan is not the only target for China to wage a war of attrition. Last year, Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels sailed in the contiguous zone to the territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands (called “Diaoyu Dao” in Taiwan and “Diaoyu Islands” in China) for a record 333 days. The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) had to respond to it. This is nothing less than the “war of attrition” that China has been attempting. It is also being discussed whether the attrition of the JCG could have negative effects on Japan’s national security. Now, after entering this year (2021), not only did the number of days that CCG vessels navigated and stayed in waters around the Senkaku Islands increase, but incidents began to occur in which CCG vessels attempted to approach Japanese fishing boats that were at the scene of the incident. 

While JCG patrol vessels often enter the space between the CCG vessels and the fishing boats in order to protect the latter, JCG needs to dispatch more patrol vessels than CCG vessels to secure numerical superiority. The JCG usually discloses information on how many CCG vessels have intruded into Senkaku waters, but not how many patrol vessels it dispatches to deal with the situation. For reference, according to a video released by “Nippon Television” on April 9, when two CCG vessels tried to approach the fishing boat of Ishigaki City Assembly member Hitoshi Nakama of Okinawa Prefecture, there were five JCG vessels on the scene. [12]

The Japanese side is in numerical superiority in this situation, although it is not clear whether the number of ships is always proportional to the ratio of five to two. Numerical superiority is important to ensure safety by creating a superior position and overwhelming the opponent. When this happens, the Japanese side, as in the case of Taiwan, will attrite more equipment and personnel than the China side.

Moreover, even if Japan has the will to quantitatively overwhelm the other side, it cannot always do so. For example, for 5 days from August 6, 2016, about 230 Chinese fishing boats and six Chinese official ships (three of which were armed) entered the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands. [13]The JCG, which had only about 470 patrol vessels, large and small, could not stop them. The Japanese government could not do anything, having been unable to invoke the “Japan-U.S. Security Treaty” for this situation. In other words, it was not only a war of attrition by China, but also psychological warfare to frustrate the opponent in showing them “You can’t resist even if you wish to.”

However, the Chinese side caused an opposite effect. Since then, the Japanese government has strengthened its security around the Senkaku Islands by increasing the equipment and personnel of the JCG, while Japanese citizens have become increasingly concerned about China’s intrusion into the waters of the Senkaku Islands. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (published on April 15), when asked what points should be emphasized in diplomacy with China (multiple answers), the largest number of respondents at 69.3% answered, “Take a strong stand against intrusions into Japanese territorial waters.” [14]

6. Emergency for Taiwan means emergency for Japan

Accordingly, Taiwan, which has been provoked by China mainly in its airspace, and Japan, which has been provoked by China mainly in its sea area, share the fate of neighboring Chinese hegemony.

Taiwan and Japan are said to be in the same boat. In other words, if Taiwan were to fall, Japan would be in danger, because China”s “Taiwan Province” would be closer to it. If China builds a submarine base in Su’ao in eastern Taiwan or directs missiles from northern Taiwan toward Japan’s Nansei Islands, it will be able to control the Miyako Strait and place most of the Nansei Islands under the threat of Chinese missiles. Japan wishes to avoid that by all means.

Recently, scenarios of an emergency in Taiwan seem to have become a hot topic in Japanese society and are being discussed. For example, an article in the “Yomiuri Shimbun” (on April 18, 2021) showed the analysis of what actions the Self-Defense Forces (SDFs) could take in the event of an emergency in Taiwan. According to the article, there are several types of actions that the SDF can take in response to situations (Situations of particularly significant impact, survival-threatening, and armed attack) stipulated in the new security legislation. [15]Every scenario assumes a “Taiwan emergency,” examining how the SDF will act on such occasion (e.g., assisting U.S. forces that support Taiwan).

Realistically speaking, however, the most feasible scenario would be that an emergency in Taiwan would immediately become an emergency in Japan, which would be forced to mobilize the SDF for its defense. The reason is the Senkaku Islands. Since the Taiwanese government claims sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (i.e., it considers Diaoyu Dao as part of Taiwan), it is highly unlikely that the PLA would attack only Taiwan Island and skip the Senkaku Islands. The PLA will no doubt consider that it should secure the Senkaku Islands from the beginning, given the tactical consideration that seizing the Senkaku Islands earlier would make it easier to take on Taiwan by attacking it from both sides.

Moreover, even if China and Japan were to promise in advance that the PLA would bypass the Senkaku Islands (maintaining the status quo on the Islands) in exchange for no intervention by Japan, the Senkaku Islands would be the next after the fall of Taiwan. That would make it more difficult to defend the Islands. That is because the Chinese “Taiwan Province” would be closer and Tokyo is far away.

Since the suppression of Hong Kong’s democratic movement by the Chinese government, some people in Japan have been discussing the future of Japan together with that of Hong Kong and Taiwan, saying that “Today’s Hong Kong will be tomorrow’s Taiwan and the Japan of the day after tomorrow.” It is a kind of domino theory, an important sense of crisis in which incidents occur one after another. However, as noted above, unless Japan renounces the Senkaku Islands, an “intermediary” called the Senkaku Islands could soon give rise to an emergency in Japan in the event of an emergency in Taiwan. It can be said that the Senkaku Islands have made Taiwan and Japan a “community with a common destiny.”

7. Japan and the U.S. pay close attention to Taiwan’s security situation

Recently, there seem to be many reports on remarks and action by Japanese politicians showing great interest in Taiwan’s security. In November of last year (2020), for example, Minister Taro Kono, in charge of administrative reform, said at a review meeting of the budget for the development of next generation fighter jets, “How to prepare and on what assumptions for an emergency in Taiwan or on the Senkaku Islands will Japan develop fighter jets? We should explain this to the Japanese people,” openly mentioning an “Emergency in Taiwan” without hesitation. [16]

On February 10 this year, the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP’s) Foreign Affairs Division established the “Taiwan Policy Review Project Team” (Taiwan PT), where it seems they discuss Taiwan’s foreign and security issues. [17]It is also of great importance that Taiwan was mentioned in the recent Japan-U.S. “2 plus 2” talks (March 16) and Japan-U.S. summit talks (April 16).

First of all, in the Japan-U.S. 2-plus-2 framework, the “Taiwan (Strait)” was included in the Japan-U.S. Joint Statement for the first time in 16 years. It included the language that “The Ministers underscored the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” [18]Looking back, in February 2005, Japan and the United States included in the 2-plus-2 joint statement “Encourage the peaceful resolution of issues relating to the Taiwan Strait through dialog” as a common strategic goal of both countries,” [19]which was in response to China’s legislation of “Anti-Secession Law” (effective on March 16, 2005) at that time. Taiwan is mentioned again this time, and there is also a Chinese factor behind it.

In the joint statement issued at the Japan-U.S. summit talks, “Taiwan Strait” was mentioned again. Moreover, the language “encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues” was added to that used at 2-plus-2. [20]

At a press conference after the meeting (April 20), Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi commented on Taiwan’s reference in the joint statement that “With China rapidly strengthening its military capabilities, the military balance with Taiwan is leaning toward China. The gap is growing year by year, and we will continue to keep a close watch on developments.” Japanese politicians paying close attention to the security situation in neighboring Taiwan is welcome.

8. Conclusion

There is a political science concept of “incrementalism.” Originally a technical term for budgeting, it refers to a method of budgeting based on the amount of the previous fiscal year’s budget and adding an extra amount to the amount. The method is characteristically easy to accept because of the small amount of adjustment. Moreover, it is also said to become difficult to reverse after several adjustments.

Slow changes are hard to detect. When we notice, some changes have already been made, becoming a solid reality.

In the Taiwan Strait and around the Senkaku Islands, anomalies are happening, despite no war breaking out. Yes, it is surely and quietly being incurred by Chinese hegemony. Japan and Taiwan, neighboring countries whose destinies are linked, should be vigilant together.


[1] Mallory Shelbourne, “Davidson: China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan In ‘Next Six Years’, ” USNI News, March 9, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try-to-take-control-of-taiwan-in-next-six-years;<中国、6年以内に台湾侵攻の恐れ」 米インド太平洋軍司 (“China could try to take control of Taiwan in the next six years” by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command)>, AFP, March 10, 2021, https://www.afpbb.com/articles/-/3335866

[2] <米軍次期司令官「最大懸念は台湾に対する中国の軍事動向」 (Next Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “The greatest concern is the military development of China toward Taiwan”)>,NHK,March 24, 2021, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20210324/k10012932451000.html?utm_int=detail_contents_news-related_001;<中國何時攻台?美印太司令人選:威脅比想像中更接近>,《美國之音》 (When will China attack Taiwan? U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Commander nominee: Chinese threat thought closer>, <<Voice of America>>), March 24, 2021, https://www.voachinese.com/a/us-sasc-indopacom-nominee-china-military-threat-to-taiwan-20210323/5826363.html.

[3] <中国軍機25機、台湾の防空圏に侵入 過去最大規模 (25 Chinese Military Aircrafts Intrude Taiwan’s Air Defense Zone, Largest Number to Date)>, <<Reuter>>, April 12, 2021, https://jp.reuters.com/article/taiwan-china-defense-idJPKBN2BZ1Y5; <台湾の防空識別圏に中国軍機延べ25機進入 台湾国防部 (Total 25 Chinese Military Aircrafts Enter Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone according to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense)>, NHK, April 13, 2021, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20210413/k10012971071000.html.

[4] “即時軍事動態 (Military News Update),” 台湾国防部 (Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan), https://tinyurl.com/wxekbk5p.

[5] <太魯閣號事故 習近平:高度關切慰問哀悼傷亡 (Xi Jinping on Taroko Express accident: High concerns expressing condolences for dead and injured)>, <<Central News Agency>>, April 3, 2021, https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202104030097.aspx.

[6] <中国の国防費 去年比6.8%増加 日本円で22兆円余計上 (China’s defense spending increased 6.8% from last year to over ¥22 trillion)> NHK, March 5, 2021, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20210305/k10012898911000.html.

[7] <台湾2021年度国防部予算、過去最多の1.3兆円 新型戦闘機調達に1千億円 (Taiwan’s FY2021 defense budget: Record ¥1.3 trillion with ¥100 billion for procurement of new fighters)>, <<Central News Agency>>, August 13, 2021, https://japan.cna.com.tw/news/apol/202008130009.aspx.

[8] <共機大打消耗戰 近半月攔截任務傳已耗我上億軍費 (Nearly a half month of scrambling jets in war of attrition forced billions in military spending)>, <<United Daily News>>, October 3, 2020, https://udn.com/news/story/10930/4906892.

[9] <民調:近8成民眾支持兩岸對話 63.3%認為大陸不會攻台 (Opinion poll: Nearly 80% of people support dialogue between both sides of the Strait, while 63.3% think the mainland will not attack Taiwan)>, <<ETToday>>, March 20, 2021, https://www.ettoday.net/news/20210320/1942420.htm.

[10] <「2020台灣民主價值與治理」民意調查記者會 會後新聞稿 (Press conference for the opinion poll on “2020 Democracy value and governance principle in Taiwan”: Post-conference newspaper article)> , Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, October 16, 2020, http://www.tfd.org.tw/export/sites/tfd/files/news/pressRelease/Press-Release_20201016.pdf

[11] <國防部:戰到最後一兵一卒 (Ministry of National Defense: Fight to the last soldier.>, <<Apple Daily>>, August 24, 2020, https://tw.appledaily.com/headline/20200824/6AEBCCEX65FGZOAO5DZGMP75WU/; “Taiwan says it will defend itself to ‘very last day’ if China attacks,” Taiwan News, April 8, 2021, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4171419.

[12] <中国海警との“にらみ合い”「尖閣諸島」領海内での緊迫映像入手 (Tense footage obtained for the “Standoff” with China Coast Guard in the Japanese territorial waters of the “Senkaku Islands”)>, <<Nippon TV News>>, April 9, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=66W5BoPs7S8.

[13]<第2節 中国>,≪日本の防衛≫(令和2年版)「第Ⅰ部 わが国を取り巻く安全保障環境」「第2章 諸外国の防衛政策など」 <Section 2. China>, <<Defense of Japan>>, (2020 edition), “Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan” “Chapter 2 Defense Policies of Countries,” http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2020/pdf/R02010202.pdf.

[14] <令和2年度外交に関する国内世論調査結果(概要) (FY2020 Domestic Public Opinion Survey on Japan’s Diplomacy(Summary))>, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, April 15, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100176586.pdf.

[15] <「台湾有事」から日本への波及懸念、自衛隊が取り得る行動は複数類型 (Concerns about spillover effects of a “Taiwan emergency” on Japan, with multiple options for possible SDF action)>, <<Yomiuri Shimbun>> April 18, 2021, https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/20210417-OYT1T50374/.

[16] <元防衛相の河野氏「台湾、尖閣有事にどう備えるか」 次期戦闘機の行政レビュー (Former Defense Minister Kono “How to prepare for emergencies in Taiwan and Senkaku” at administrative reviews of next generation fighter jets)>, <<Sankei Shimbun>>, November 14, 2020, https://www.sankei.com/politics/news/201114/plt2011140007-n1.html.

[17] <自民外交部会「台湾PT」立ち上げ 佐藤氏「日本の安全保障にも影響」 (LDP’s Foreign Affairs Division establishes “Taiwan PT”: Mr. Sato “It affects Japan’s national security”)>, <<Sankei Shimbun>>, February 10, 2021, https://www.sankei.com/politics/news/210210/plt2102100022-n1.html; (自民 台湾との関係強化向けプロジェクトクチーム発足)<LDP Launches Project Team to Strengthen Ties with Taiwan>, NHK, February 10, 2021, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20210210/k10012860071000.html.

[18]<日米安全保障協議委員会(2+2)共同発表(仮訳)> <Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2-plus-2) (tentative translation)>, Ministry of Defense of Japan, March 16, 2021, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/kyougi/2021/0316b_usa-j.html.

[19] Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 19, 2005, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html.

[20] <日米首脳共同声明「新たな時代における日米グローバル・パートナーシップ」 (U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement: “U.S.-JAPAN GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR A NEW ERA”)>, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, April 16, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100177719.pdf.

助理研究員 / 国防安全研究院非伝統的安全および軍事任務研究所